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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREAT
MENT-DECISIONS TO TERMINATE LIFE-PROLONGING TREATMENT
FOR INCOMPETENT PATIENTs-ln re Spring, No. 2030 (Mass., or
der of Jan. 14, 1980).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In re Springl is the most recent of a Massachusetts series of
cases involving the right to refuse life-prolonging treatment on be
half of an incompetent patient. The patient in this case was a
78-year-old senile man who suffered from kidney disease requiring
kidney dialysis. Mter his wife and son petitioned the probate court
to have the dialysis treatments discontinued, the Massachusetts Su
preme Judicial Court ruled that the probate court could grant the
petition. The cases which form the background to In re Spring in
clude the New Jersey case of In re Quinlan 2 and the Massachusetts
cases of Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz 3
and In re Dinnerstein. 4 The rulings in these cases have important
implications regarding society's treatment of incompetent patients,
particularly those suffering from illnesses which would be terminal
if not treated. This note will discuss In re Spring, the three cases
which precede it, and the implications of this most recent case.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

In re Quinlan

When Quinlan 5 was decided by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in 1976, nationwide attention was focused on the kinds of
ethical problems raised by the rapid advances made in medical
technology.6 Karen Ann Quinlan was in an irreversible coma which
her physician characterized as a "chronic persistent vegetative
1. No. 2030 (Mass., order of Jan. 14, 1980).
2. 70 N.J. 10,355 A.2d 647 (1976), cen. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
3. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2461, 370 N.E.2d 417.
4. 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 736,380 N.E.2d 134.
5. 70 N.J. at 10, 355 A.2d at 647.
6. The problem Of deciding when someone should not be treated when previ
ously no treatment was available and the problem of who shall be treated when deal
ing with scarce resources such as transplants and sophisticated machines, existed, of
course, before the Quinlan case focused public attention on them. See, e.g., Annas,
Medical Remedies and Human Rights: Why Civil Rights Lawyers Must Become In
volved in Medical Decision-Making, 2 HUMAN RIGHTS 151 (1972).
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state."7 Kept alive by a respirator,8 she was described as emaci
ated, her posture fetal-like and grotesque. The medical prognosis
was that she was unlikely to ever regain consciousness, and it was
noted that there was no known treatment which promised to cure
or to improve her condition. 9 Her father's request that life-sus
taining mechanisms be removed was opposed by her doctors, the
hospital, the Morris County prosecutor, the State of New Jersey,
and her guardian ad litem. 10
In acknowledging that life-sustaining apparatus may be re
moved even though death might ensue, the New Jersey court
stated that the constitutional right of privacyll must be weighed
against the state's interest in the preservation of life. This right of
privacy allows a patient to decide to refuse treatment under certain
circumstances,12 and this right could be asserted on a patient's be
half by a guardian. 13
The QUinlan decision focused on the medical prognosis that it
was unlikely Karen would "return to cognitive and sapient life, as
distinguished from the forced continuance of that biological vegeta
tive existence to which [she] seems to be doomed."14 The court's
preference for allowing the physician, with the concurrence of the
family, to make the decision to remove her from the respirator fol
lowed logically from this emphasis on medical prognosis. The court
rejected the notion that such a decision should be made by the
courts, characterizing it as a "gratuitous encroachment upon the
medical profession's field of competence" as well as being "impossi
7. 70 N.J. at 24,355 A.2d at 654.
8. This was the supposition of the court and all the medical authorities. At this
writing, however, Karen Quinlan lives, still in a coma, despite the respirator having
been withdrawn.
9. 70 N.J. at 26,355 A.2d at 655.
10. Id. at 22, 355 A.2d at 653.
11. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973) (state criminal abortion statutes violate the right to privacy); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptive devices
or drugs to unmarried persons violates individual's right to privacy); Stanley v.
Georgia-, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (statute prohibiting mere private possession of obscene
material violates right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (stat
u~e forbidding use of contraception violates right of marital privacy). See also,
Kindregan, The Court as Forum for Life and Death Decisions: Reflections on Proce
dures for Substituted Consent, 11 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 919, 921 (1977); Comment,

Withholding Treatment from Defective Newborns: Substituted Judgment, Informed
Consent, and the Quinlan Decision, 13 GONZ. L. REV. 781, 790 (1978).
12. 70 N.J. at 39-41, 355 A.2d at 663-64. The right of privacy takes precedent
over the state's interest in preserving life as the degree of bodily invasion of the
treatment increases and the medical prognosis worsens. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
13. Id.
14. [d. at 51, 355 A.2d at 669.
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bly cumbersome. "15 Furthermore, while essentially leaving the de
cision to the patient's doctor and family, the court held that the
concurrence of a hospital ethics committee would be required be
fore life-sustaining procedures could be withdrawn. 16 Such a com
mittee would function both as a procedural safeguard and as an in
surer that no civil or criminal liability would ensue. 17
The Quinlan decision shattered precedent in its judicial recog
nition of the right to withhold treatment needed for the preserva
tion of an incompetent patient's life. 1s Once this right was enunci
ated, however, the crucial questions became who should make
such a decision and what criteria should be used. Viewing the deci
sive factor of the case as the medical prognosis, the Quinlan court
saw no reason why decisions made on a medical basis should be
evaluated by a court. 19
B.

Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz

Saikewicz 20 involved the issue of whether to administer chem
otherapy to a severely retarded 67-year-old man suffering from leu
15. Id. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
16. Id. at 54,355 A.2d at 671.
17. Id. The New Jersey court's requirement of an ethics committee with legal
status to rule on the termination of life-sustaining treatment derives from an idea in a
law review article written by a physician, Dr. Karen Teel. Teel, The Physician's
Dilemma, A Doctor's View: What the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6 (1975).
Dr. Teel wrote of the ethical judgments which physicians make by virtue of their re
sponsibility for medical judgments despite the lack of training to make these judg
ments, and despite the lack of moral and legal authority to make them. She em
braced the idea of a committee to share responsibility, although noting that many
physicians and families would oppose this intrusion on what she characterizes as
"personal and private problems." Id. at 8-9. The Quinlan court cited with approval
the idea of a diffusion of professional responsibility for such a decision. 70 N.J. at
49-50, 355 A.2d at 669. The approach of judicial intervention later adopted by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Saikewicz is not considered in the article.
18. See generally Schultz, Swartz & Appelbaum, Deciding Right-to-Die Cases
InvolVing Incompetent Patients: Jones v. Saikewicz, 11 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 936,
938-39 (1977). Some commentators, following Quinlan, expressed fear at what was
regarded as a devaluation of life. See, e.g., Roddy, The Karen Quinlan Case-A Con
stitutional Right to Die?, 58 CHI. B. REC. 120, 123 (1976). But see Comment, supra
note 11, at 782, 783.
19. See 70 N.J. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669. Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and
Saikewicz: Decision Making for the Terminally III Incompetent, 4 AM. J.L. & MED.
367, 380 (1979). For more discussion of the Quinlan decision see Coburn, In re
Quinlan: A Practical Overview, 31 ARK. L. REV. 59 (1977); Collester, Death, Dying
and the Law: A Prosecutorial View of the Quinlan Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 304
(1977); Note, The Right to Die a Natural Death: A Discussion of In re Quinlan and
the California Natural Death Act, 46 U. CrN. L. REV. 192 (1977); Note, The Legal
Aspects of the Right to Die: Before and After the Quinlan Decision, 65 Ky. L.J. 823
(1977); Note, In re Quinlan: Defining the Basis for Terminating Life Support Under
the Right of Privacy, 12 TULSA L.J. 150 (1976).
20. 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2461, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
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kemia. In affirming the probate court .decision not to order treat
ment, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court specifically
rejected the Quinlan court's approach:
We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the ultimate
decision-making responsibility away from the duly established
courts of proper jurisdiction to any committee, panel or group.
. . . Thus, we reject the approach adopted by the New Jer
sey Supreme Court in the Quinlan case of entrusting the deci
sion whether to continue artificial life support to the patient's
guardian, family, attending doctors, and hospital's "ethics com
mittee. "21

While recognizing that the constitutional right of privacy allows a
patient to refuse medical treatment22 and that this right extends to
an incompetent as well as to a competent patient,23 the court held
that the proper vehicle for the exercise of this right on behalf of an
incompetent is the substituted judgment test24 which allows the
court to substitute its judgment for that of the incompetent patient.
It was determined that a probate judge could issue the appropriate
order should he or she "be satisfied that the incompetent individ
ual would . . . have chosen to forego potentially life-prolonging
treatment . . . . If the judge is not so persuaded, or finds that the
interests of the state require it, then treatment shall be ordered. "25
In determining what Mr. Saikewiczwould have wanted were
he competent to formulate such a desire, the Massachusetts Su
preme Judicial Court weighed the factors considered by the pro
bate judge. Two factors were cited in favor of treatment: Most
people elect such treatment; and such treatment would offer the
chance of a longer life. 26 Six factors, however, were cited as weigh
ing against the administration of chemotherapy: Saikewicz's age; his
inability to cooperate in the treatment; the probable adverse side
effects; the low chance of producing remission; the certainty that
the treatment would cause immediate pain and suffering; and the
quality of life possible for him even if remission did occur. 27 The
21. [d. at 2499-2500, 370 N.E.2d at 434.
22. [d. at 2474-75, 370 N.E.2d at 424.
23. [d. at 2482-83, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
24. The common law doctrine of substituted judgment has long been used to
allow courts and guardians to make a variety of decisions for an incompetent. See
Schultz, Swartz & Appelbaum, supra note 18, at 943-49 for a summary of the history
of this doctrine.
25. [d. at 2498-99, 370 N.E.2d at 434.
26. [d. at 2469,370 N.E.2d at 422.
27. [d.

1980]

REFUSING MEDICAL TREATMENT

763

supreme judicial court reviewed these factors, carefully qualifying
two of them. Saikewicz's age was to be considered only because
medical evidence showed that people of his age do not tolerate
chemotherapy as well as younger people and that remission is less
likely. The question of age was irrelevant "of course" to the value
of his life. 28 The term "quality of life" was to be understood solely
"as a reference to the continuing state of pain and disorientation
precipitated by chemotherapy."29 The value of life was not to be
equated in any way with the quality of life. 30 Based on these fac
tors, the court found that Saikewicz would have rejected treatment
if he were miraculously competent and had knowledge of his own
incompetence.
The Massachusetts court's rejection of the Quinlan court's so
lution led to controversy. The medical community was outraged at
what it viewed as a usurpation of the role and the responsibility of
the medical profession. 31 The feelings of affront were exacerbated
by the knowledge that the Saikewicz court was declaring that med
ical decisions that some doctors routinely make, as in decisions not
to treat defective newborns,32 could be reviewed by the courts.
The resentment was also aggravated by legal advisors' misc:on
struing the court's decision as requiring judicial intervention for
every life or death decision. 33 Confusion reigned, but was partially
abated by the appeals court decision in In re Dinnerstein. This de
cision delineated one situation, at least, not intended to be covered
by the Saikewicz decision.

C.

In re Dinnerstein

The Dinnerstein 34 case was described by Justice Liacos, the
author of the Saikewicz decision, as "a case that need never have
28. Id. at 2493 n.l7, 370 N.E.2d at 432 n.17.
29. Id. at 2494-95, 370 N.E.2d at 432.
30. Id. at 2494, 370 N.E.2d at 432.
-31. See Baron, Assuring "Detached but Passionate Investigation and Deci
sion": The Role of Guardians Ad Litem in Saikewicz-type Cases, 4 AM. J. L. & MED.
111, 116 (1978); Curran, The Saikewicz Decision, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 499, 500
(1978); Liacos, Dilemmas of Dying, Medicolegal News Fall 1979, at 6; Reiman, The
Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 233,234 (978).
32. For a discussion of this issue see Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Di
lemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973); Robertson,
Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV.
213 (1975).
33. See Curran, supra note 31, at 500; Liacos, supra note 26, at 6; Reiman, su
pra note 31, at 234, 237.
34. 78 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 736, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978).
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been litigated because it was clearly without the scope of Saike
WiCZ."35 Dinnerstein involved a 67-year-old woman suffering from
Alzheimer's disease, a degenerative disease of the brain. The
court's opinion described her as being "in an essentially vegetative
state, immobile, speechless, unable to swallow without choking,
and barely able to cough. "36 She was fed through a naso-gastric
tube, required a catheter and bowel care, suffered from high blood
pressure, which was difficult to control, and had arteriosclerosis. 37
The patient's family, along with the doctor and hospital, brought an
action for declaratory relief, asking that the doctor be permitted to
enter an order not to resuscitate in the event of cardiac or respira
tory arrest free from judicial authorization. Alternatively, the family
sought judicial authorization for such an order.38
The appeals court decided that the Saikewicz rule, requiring
court determination before treatment could be refused for an in
competent patient, did not apply in this case. The court stated that
cardiac and respiratory arrest are part of the normal act of death. 39
Saikewicz referred to potentially life-prolonging treatments, not to
"a mere suspension of the act of dying."4o
[T]he Saikewicz case, if read to apply to the natural death of a
terminally ill patient by cardiac or respiratory arrest, would re
quire attempts to resuscitate dying patients in most cases, with
out exercise of medical judgment, even when that course of ac
tion could aptly be characterized as a pointless, even cruel,
prolongation of the act of dying.
We think it clear that such a result is neither intended nor
sanctioned by the Saikewicz case. 41

Saikewicz, therefore, is relevant only when treatment involves a
lifesaving or life-prolonging alternative in a situation when death is
not inevitable. 42
Dinnerstein held that the question of "what measures are ap
propriate to ease the imminent passing of an irreversibly, termi
nally ill patient" is a medical decision, not a judicial one. 43 Like
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Liacos, supra note 31, at 7.
78 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 737, 380 N.E.2d 135 (1978).
[d. at 738, 380 N.E.2d at 135.
[d. at 740, 380 N.E.2d at 136.
Id. at 741, 380 N.E.2d at 136.
[d. at 744, 380 N.E.2d at 138.
Id. at 742, 380 N.E.2d at 137.
[d. at 746, 380 N.E.2d at 139.
[d. at 746, 380 N.E.2d at 139.
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the Quinlan court, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the
view that decisions based solely on medical prognosis are to be
made by doctors with the approval of the patient's family. The
court distinguished the considerations involved in cases such as
Mrs. Dinnerstein's from the considerations involved in cases such
as Saikewicz. The latter involve alternatives which offer "hope
of restoration to normal, integrated, functioning, cognitive exis
tence."44
Dinnerstein, too, _generated confusion in areas ranging from
the lack of definition of such terms as "terminal illness" to the is
sue of the quality of life, seemingly introduced by the appeals
court's mentioning "normal, integrated, functioning, cognitive ex
istence."45 Some commentators found the Dinnerstein decision in
consistent with Saikewicz. 46 In re Spring47 exemplifies this confu
sion.
III.

IN RE SPRING

The Spring4S case is one calculated to revive the fears of those
who viewed Quinlan and Saikewicz as indicating a diminution in
society's traditional belief in the sanctity of life. 49 Mr. Spring was a
78-year-old senile man suffering from kidney disease. He was being
sustained by dialysis which substituted for his absent kidney func
tion. Without dialysis he would die. 50 Somewhat confused when
the dialysis treatments began in February 1978, his confusion or
incompetency subsequently worsened: Aside from the lack of kid
ney function, his general physical condition was good for a man of
his age. With dialysis and no other complications he could conceiv
ably have lived another five years. 51
About a year after the dialysis treatments began, Mr. Spring's
son (his temporary guardian) and his wife, petitioned the probate
44. Id. at 746, 380 N.E.2d at 138.
45. See text accompanying notes 52-62 infra.
46. See, e.g., McCarthy, Withholding of Medical Treatment from a Terminally
Ill, Incompetent Patient-A Departure from Saikewicz, 63 MASS. L. REV. 263, 264
(1978); Note, Constitutional Law-Right of Privacy--{}ualified Right to Refuse Med
ical Treatment May Be Asserted for Incompetent Under Doctrine of Substituted
Judgment-Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, _Mass.__,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), 27 EMORY L.J. 425, 459 (1978).
47. No. 2030 (Mass., order of Jan. 14, 1980).
48. Id.
49. See Collester, supra note 19, at 327.
50. 79 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2469, 2471, 399 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1979).
51. Transcript of Probate Court hearing at 10-11.
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court for an order allowing the dialysis to be terminated. The pro
bate judge appointed a guardian ad litem who opposed such an or
der. After a hearing, a judgment was entered ordering that no fur
ther treatment be authorized. The guardian ad litem appealed
from, and obtained, a stay of that judgment. Shortly thereafter, the
probate judge sua sponte vacated the first judgment and entered a
new judgment allowing the wife, son, and attending physician to
make the decision whether to terminate dialysis treatment. 52 In
the second judgment the judge paraphrased language found in the
Dinnerstein opinion, stating that the court's authority to make a
decision was limited by Saikewicz. The court held, however, that
since the facts "do not offer a lifesaving or life-prolonging treatment
alternative" as formulated in Saikewicz, doctors, not judges, must
determine "what measures are appropriate to ease the passing of
an irreversibly ill, terminal patient, in light of the patient's history
and condition and the wishes of his supportive family. "53
In an opinion by Justice Armstrong54 the appeals court af
firmed the probate court's second judgment. The opinion, how
ever, failed to affirm explicitly that Spring does not come within
Saikewicz. Reference was made to Saikewicz, but the opinion
noted that since the role of the incompetent's family did not arise
in Saikewicz because Mr. Saikewicz was a ward of the state, there
was nothing in that case which would prohibit the family from hav
ing an important role. 55 The opinion questioned the form of the
second judgment which authorized the physician and the family to
decide whether to continue dialysis, contrasting it with the first
judgment which was a direct order that the legal guardian refrain
from consenting to continued treatment, but stated that since "the
second judgment will have the substantial effect of carrying out the
needs and desires of the ward," it need not be disturbed. 56 Per
haps this is an implicit acknowledgment that the substituted judg
ment test enunciated by Saikewicz does rule.
The appeals court decision left many disturbing questions
unanswered. The appeals court did not question the probate court's
finding that Mr. Spring was "an irreversibly ill, terminal patient. "57
52. 79 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2469,399 N.E.2d at 495.
53. Record at 31. But see note 58 infra.
54. It is interesting to note that Justice Annstrong is also the author of the
Dinnerstein opinion.
55. 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2484,399 N.E.2d at 503.
56. Id. at 2485, 399 N.E.2d at 503.
57. Record at 31.
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Terminal illness was not defined. Certainly, the kidney dysfunction
is irreversible; and just as certainly Mr. Spring will die without
dialysis. The crucial question, however, is whether a condition is
terminal if a treatment exists which will take the place of the
malfunctioning organ. An analogy may be made to diabetes. Insulin
replaces the function of the pancreas; without insulin diabetics will
die. Few people, however, think of diabetes as a terminal illness. 58
Procedurally, the appeals court interpreted Saikewicz as re
quiring judicial intervention only when there is uncertainty as to
the course of treatment a patient would choose. Typically such un
certainty would be evidenced by disagreement among members of
the family, or between the family and the medical professional, as
to the appropriate course of action. 59 In Spring, where family and
physician were in agreement, there was, presumably, no need to
go to court at all according to the appeals court criteria, except to
assure the physician that he was immune from possible criminal or
civil liability. The appeals court, however, does understand Saike
wicz as requiring "that treatment decisions in cases of incompetent
patients be made in accordance with what the patient would him
self choose, where that choice is not in violation of State policy or
medical ethics. "60 Nevertheless, the court does not explain any
procedure to ensure that the family and physician are indeed mak
ing their decision on the basis of what the patient would want. The
court discusses the law's role as one which does not displace the
traditional role of the family and the physician, but which acts to
protect the rights of the incompetent person by determining what
his wish would be. 61 There is no indication, however, how this
protection can be afforded if the family and the physician are free
to act on their own initiative as long as they agree.
This view seems at variance with the Saikewicz court's explicit
rejection of the Quinlan approach. It is difficult to distinguish the
appeals court's approach from that in Quinlan. Conceivably, even
the New Jersey court might reject such an approach under the
58. The nature of kidney disease was an element in another recent Massa
chusetts .decision in which state interests were found to outweigh a competent, adult
prisoner's desire to refuse dialysis. Here the court stated that although the kidney
disease could be technically classified as incurable, it was not life threatening in the
sense that he would die regardless of the treatment received. Commissioner of Cor
rections v. Myers, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2523, 2530, 399 N.E.2d 452,456 (1979).
59. 79 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2484,399 N.E.2d at 502-03.
60. Id. at 2484, 399 N.E.2d at 502.
61. Id. at 2483,399 N.E.2d at 502.
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facts of Spring. The QUinlan case was decided on the basis of the
medical prognosis that Karen Quinlan would never regain con
sciousness. Mr. Spring, however, was conscious; and with dialysis
he functioned physically as he would have if he did not have kid
ney disease. The apparent determining factor was his senility. The
decision to terminate his treatment, therefore, was not a decision
made on the basis of medical prognosis, but one influenced by a
judgment made about the value of the life of a senile person.
The appeals court accepted the probate court's finding that the
ward would wish to have the dialysis treatments discontinued on
the ground that it was a finding of fact that was not clearly errone
OUS. 62 The court rejected the argument that an expression of such
intent by the ward, when competent, was necessary for such a
finding, contending that such a ruling would nullify the privacy
rights of incompetents enunciated by Saikewicz. 63 Consequently,
the court determined that other evidence could be used to deter
mine the ward's wishes. Unfortunately, the important question of
what quantum of evidence is necessary to support a finding of the
ward's alleged wish was not answered.
The Saikewicz decision appeared expressly to prohibit consid
eration of some of the evidence actually considered by the probate
court in Spring. For instance, despite the Saikewicz court's deter
mination that age was relevant only with respect to an assessment
of the efficacy of the treatment considered and not in terms of the
value of life, the appeals court allowed consideration of the pa
tient's age. In applying the balancing test between the patient's
privacy rights and the state's interest in the preservation of life, the
appeals court stated that the state's interest carried far less weight
"where the patient is approaching the end of his normal life
span. "64 The appeals court also was willing to assess the patient's
quality of life in a way rejected by the Saikewicz court. The court
stated that Mr. Spring's mental condition would be a relevant fac
tor, as his case is factually distinguishable from Saikewicz. In
Saikewicz the patient was mentally retarded and had never known
any other condition. In Spring the patient had been competent.
Mental condition was, therefore, relevant when there was evidence
that the state of incompetency would be a factor the patient him
self would consider. 65 The court noted that Mr. Spring's having
62.

Id. at 2476,399 N.E.2d at 498.

63.

[d. at 2474-75, 399 N.E.2d at 498.

64.
65.

Id. at 2483, 399 N.E.2d at 502.
Id. at 2476-77, 399 N.E.2d at 499.
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consented to, or at least acquiesced in, the initiation of the dialysis
treatment was probably the strongest factor for finding that he
would not want the treatment discontinued. Nevertheless, the
court held that this factor was undermined by Mr. Spring's dimin
ished ability to understand the necessity for treatment. 66
Besides extrapolating what the patient would wish, considering
his age and mental condition, the court gave great weight to Mrs.
Spring's belief that the treatments ought to be terminated and that
discontinuance would be her husband's desire, although the matter
had never been discussed by them. 67 The court found that if a pa
tient was fortunate enough to have a close family which was in
agreement with the physician, the law should give its collective
opinion substantial weight. The court stated that there is nothing
in Saikewicz which casts doubt on the importance of the role of the
family in such a decision. 68 Perhaps there is nothing in Saikewicz
which states that the family's role is not important, but the
Saikewicz court was very explicit in not entrusting to the patient's
family and physician the decision to discontinue life support; yet,
this is essentially what the appeals court did.
On appeal the supreme judicial court reversed the probate
court's second judgment, concluding that the facts of the case bring
it within the rule of Saikewicz and that it was in error to delegate
the decision to the family and to the attending physician. 69 The
court concluded, however, that the judge's finding that the ward
would choose to discontinue the life-prolonging treatment was war
ranted by the evidence. 70
IV.

ANALYSIS OF SPRING

The supreme judicial court's order in Spring reaffirmed its de
cision in Saikewicz that a court is the appropriate tribunal to de
cide whether to discontinue or to withhold life-prolonging treat
ment. This decision is sound in cases where the issue is social and
66. ld. at 2478,399 N.E.2d at 499.
67. Transcript at 32.
68. 79 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2484, 399 N.E.2d at 503. Noting that the
Springs had been married for 55 years and that their son lived across the street from
them for 15 years and visited frequently, the court stated that "It is evident that we
are dealing with a close-knit family unit, w'ith a long history of mutual love, concern
and support." ld. at 2477, 399 N.E.2d at 499. The court shows a touching, if naive as
sumption of congmence between the longevity of a relationship and affection.
69. In re Spring, No. 2030, at 2 (Mass., order of Jan. 14, 1980).
70. ld. On remand, the probate court ordered that treatment be discontinued.
In re Spring, No. 49076 (Mass. P. Ct., order ofJan. 17, 1980).
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ethical rather than solely medical. In both Quinlan and Dinnerstein
the patients were in irreversible comas, and there was no hope
that either patient would resume any kind of human functioning.
In such cases, a decision to allow a patient to die rather than to
prolong artificially what scarcely can be considered life is a decision
based on medical criteria and can appropriately be made by a phy
sician with the concurrence of the family. In both Saikewicz and
Spring, however, the patients were functioning human beings, al
though mentally incompetent. The decision to withhold chemo
therapy for Mr. Saikewicz and the decision to discontinue dialysis
for Mr. Spring were not based solely on medical prognoses and
were contrary to similar decisions made by the vast majority of
competent adults suffering from cancer or from kidney disease. Ap
parently, the decisions differed from those customarily made by
similar patients because Mr. Saikewicz and Mr. Spring were men
tally incompetent. Saikewicz and Spring, therefore, were social and
ethical decisions, not decisions based on medical criteria.
In our society the courts have been given the social mandate
to make social and ethical decisions.71 It is important that these de
cisions be made in a forum whose procedures assure patients of at
least a modicum of due process. As the Saikewicz court stated,
"[S]uch questions of life and death seem ... to require the process
of detached but passionate investigation and decision that forms the
ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created. "72
One commentator enumerated the qualities of the judicial process
which make the courts the appropriate forum for such decisions as
follows: The public nature of judicial proceeding; the fact that the
judge's decision must be principled, with appellate courts, legisla
tive bodies, and legal commentators functioning as backstops; the
impartiality of courts as decisionmakers; and the adversary nature
of judicial proceedings. 73 Since these decisions affect societal atti
tudes toward human life, it is important that they be made in pub
lic and be made by individuals who are "institutionally responsible
to the public for making principled and impartial decisions. "74 A
further benefit of the court's functioning as the decisionmaker will
See Annas, supra note 19 at 384; Liacos, supra note 31, at 7.
77 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2501, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
Baron, Medical Paternalism and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Reiman, 4
AM. J. L. & MED. 337, 347-49 (1979). See also Comment, The Problem of Prolonged
Death: Who Shall Decide?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 169, 172-73 (1975).
74. Baron, supra note 73, at 362.
71.
72.
73.
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be the development of a body of common law based on societal
values to aid decisions in future cases. 75
Allowing the physician and the family to decide whether to
withhold life-prolonging treatment would grant the power of deci
sion to potentially biased parties. Although well-meaning, physi
cians and relatives may be influenced by factors irrelevant to what
the patient would want if competent to decide. Furthermore, in
such a situation the family is not likely to be in an emotional condi
tion conducive to making a reasoned decision. 76
The Spring court's affirmation of the necessity of judicial de
termination is eminently sensible, but the facts of the case and the
quantum of evidence deemed sufficient for the court to determine
that a patient would wish to discontinue treatment do not induce
confidence in the substituted judgment test. By affirming the pro
bate court's decision that under the substituted judgment test Mr.
Spring would wish to have the dialysis treatment discontinued, the
supreme judicial court seems to be relying predominantly on Mrs.
Spring's belief that that would be her husband's desire. Without
any expression on the part of the patient while still competent and
without any other evidence, it appears that the court is in reality
allowing the family and physician to make the decision as long as
they resort to a court for ratification of the decision. At the hearing
held at the probate court, only three witnesses testified: The physi
cian who is director of the kidney center where Mr. Spring re
ceived dialysis; Mr. Spring's wife; and Mr. Spring's son. 77 There
was no testimony from a neutral medical expert, nor from a physi
cian having a more personal and long-standing relationship with
the patient, nor from any of the personnel of the nursing home
where Mr. Spring resides. 78 The testimony of such people would
be appropriate. The circumstances in this case may serve to con
firm the fears of commentators that judicial decisions will function
75. Id. at 353.
76. See id. at 350; Corbett & Raciti, Withholding Life-Prolonging Medical
Treatment from the Institutionalized Person-Who Decides?, 3 NEW ENG. J. ON
PRISON L. 47, 77 (1976); Kindregan, supra note 11, at 933. But see, Cantor, Quinlan,
Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243,
255 (1977); ReIman, supra note 31, at 241.
77. Record at 2, 28, 33.
78. Newspaper reports indicated concern about the decision on the part of
nursing home personnel. See Marchand, Mr. Spring is Not Comatose . .. Mr. Spring
is Very Sick, Boston Herald American, Dec. 30, 1979 at 1, Col. 1; Spring 'no sicker
than many', Greenfield Recorder, Jan. 17, 1980 at AI, Col. 3.
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to immunize physicians from liability, without a truly adversary
proceeding. 79
In Spring objective consideration did not conclusively indicate
that Mr. Spring would wish to discontinue treatment. The progno
sis for him indicated that his mental condition would not improve 8o
and that the kidney disease was irreversible. 81 Dialysis treatments,
however, replace the function of the kidneys; and the kidney dis
ease is terminal only if the dialysis is stopped. With dialysis he
could have lived possibly another five years. 82 The dialysis was de
scribed as uncomfortable rather than as painful. 83
In view-of the fact that the vast majority of Competent patients
suffering from kidney disease elect to undergo dialysis treatment, it
is clear that Mr. Spring's senility was the determinative factor in
finding that he would choose to die. This is akin to finding that
most senile patients would choose to reject intrusive medical treat
ment in favor of dying. This conclusion is disputable. As one com
mentator has stated, "When a majority of competent individuals
have already weighed these interests and chosen life, a court
should not transform an incompetent's legitimate interest in bodily
privacy into a judicially enforced right to die."84

v.

PROPOSED STANDARDS

The forthcoming supreme judicial court opinion should clearly
state both the criteria to be used in determining the wishes of the
incompetent patient and the burden of proof that must be satisfied
before the supposed wishes of the patient outweigh the state's in
terest in the preservation of life. Perhaps it is more likely than not
that Mr. Spring would have wished to die, but it is not clear and
convincing to this observer, and certainly is not beyond a reason
able doubt. Where medical treatment is uncomfortable rather than
painful, the presumption should be that a patient would choose to '
live. The appeals court focused on the description of Mr. Spring as
having been previously an avid outdoorsman 85 implying that some
one who had been very active when younger would prefer death to
a life of forced inactivity. It is just as logical to conclude that such a
man would cling to life. One commentator has argued that people
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Kindregan, supra note 11, at 931.
Transcript at 23.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 9.
Schultz, Swartz & Appelbaum, supra note 18, at 958.
79 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2470,2475,399 N.E.2d at 495,498.
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care about how they will be remembered and would not wish to
exist in a debilitated, helpless state of which they are not con
scious. 86 Undoubtedly, some individuals feel this way. Conversely,
some people hope that they will be cared for and will not be left to
die because they are old and no longer mentally alert. The truth,
of course, is that without some prior expression we simply do not
know how a particular individual would feel. Without such evi
dence, it is the position of the author that we should err on the
side of valUing life for its own sake.
In Saikewicz, the court held that decisions to withhold or to
terminate life-prolonging treatment on behalf of incompetents
should be made by the courts rather than by the patient's physi
cian and family. While affirming Saikewicz and using the subjective
substituted judgment test, the court in Spring found that the in
competent would choose to discontinue treatment based primarily
on the family's feeling that that was what he would desire. In es
sence, this allows the family and physician to make the decision
with the court's ratification. A better standard would be to deter
mine the patient's desire using an objective test. When there has
been no prior expression of what the patient would wish in such a
situation, a determination of what that patient would want is virtu
ally impossible. In these cases it would be appropriate to consider
what most persons are likely to do in a similar situation. 87
In summary, the author recommends that the following factors
be examined in any decision involving the termination of medical
treatment that might result in death. The risks or pain involved in
a particular treatment should be considered. 88 The quality of an
other person's life, however, cannot be properly assessed and,
therefore, should not be a consideration. Along with giving incom
petents the right to refuse treatment, we must also dignify their
status with the acknowledgement that they are still human beings.
It is not clear that senile adults in need of dialysis or other medical
treatment would be better off dead than alive. We must assume,
therefore, that unless there is persuasive evidence to the contrary,
an incompetent would wish to undergo treatment in the same cir
cumstances that a competent patient would. The financial and emo
tional burdens of a patient's family should be a consideration only
to the extent that there is e.vidence that these burdens would be
86. Cantor, supra note 76, at 258.
87. See id. at 259.
88. The probate court in Saikewicz found the side effects of chemotherapy to
be a factor in arriving at a decision. 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2467, 2469, 370 N.E.2d at
421-22.
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considered by the patient. Our society must find ways to ease
these burdens without cutting short the patient's life.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In a decision6~sed primarily on a hopeless medical prognosis,
the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in Quinlan that an incompe
tent patient's family and physician, in conjunction with a hospital
ethics committee, could decide to terminate life-prolonging treat
ment in the exercise of the patient's constitutional right to privacy.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Saikewicz affirmed
that an incompetent patient has the same right to refuse treatment
as a competent patient but rejected the Quinlan approach. The
Massachusetts court designated the probate court as the appropri
ate decisionmaker, directing the probate court to use a subjective
substituted judgment test in arriving at its decision.
In re Spring affirms Saikewicz in placing the decision with the
probate court rather than with the patient's family and physician.
Spring is disappointing, however, for it allows the probate court to
find that a patient would wish to die solely on the basis of a state
ment by his wife that she thinks he would want to die. In not
stipulating the quantum of evidence necessary or the burden of
proof to be weighed, the court undermines the substituted judg
ment test by allowing the family and physician to decide to termi
nate life-prolonging treatment with the probate court's ratification.
A better approach would be to require clear and convincing evi
dence, or even evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and to rebut
a presumption that most people would prefer to live. In criminal
cases the reasonable doubt standard is used because of the serious
ness of depriving a person of his liberty.89 Surely, the deprivation
here is as serious. Where no evidence regarding the patient's
wishes exists, an objective test should be used. The court should
consider the risks or pain involved in the treatment and the course
of action taken in a similar situation by most competent patients. 90

Marian Solomon Lubinsky
89. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
90. After affidavits were filed by a nurse and a physician stating that they had
spoken to Mr. Spring, the guardian ad litem filed a motion in the probate court ask
ing that the court order a rehearing. No. 80-37 (Mass., memorandum and order, of
Feb. 4, 1980, 8). On appeal from the probate court's denial of this motion, Justice
Quirico, sitting alone, granted the motion, ordering that a panel of three physicians
be appointed to report on whether or not Mr. Spring was competent to make his own
decision. No. 80-37 (Mass., interlocutory judgment of Feb. 4, 1980, 2-4). Earle Spring
died of natural causes on Apr. 6, 1980, the day before the panel· was to report.

